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The NCAA's Regulations
Related to the Use of Agents in
the Sport of Baseball:
Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the
Amateur Athlete?
By Richard T. Karcher*

When one considers what a sports
agent does, he or she often recalls the movie
Jerry Maguire, in which Tom Cruise hustles
prospective clients and does whatever it takes
to keep or acquire a client, even if it means
stealing a client from a competitor. Of course,
this reprehensible conduct
only
takes
place among
sports agents,
not in other industries, right?
Sports agents
have gained
the reputation
of being corrupt and "unscrupulous"
actors
who
take advantage of amateur and professional
athletes in favor of their own proprietary selfinterest. Much of this negative sentiment
stems from highly publicized cases involving
sports agents engaged in illegal conduct.'
The crimes committed by a few "bad
apples" prompted the enactment of numerous, comprehensive state statutes and governing rules established by professional sports
players unions and collegiate athletic governing bodies.2 For example, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has enacted
a strict set of bylaws regulating the use of
agents by amateur athletes. Among these pro-

visions, an amateur athlete is prohibited from
retaining anyone, including a competent lawyer or agent, to represent him or her in the
negotiation of a professional sports contract.
This is otherwise known as the "no agent
rule." According to the NCAA, these regulations are necessary to promote and ensure

"Sports agents have gained
the reputation of corrupt and
"unscrupulous" actors who
take advantage of amateur
and professional athletes..."
amateurism in intercollegiate athletics. 3
When looking at these regulations, the
unavoidable question arises: who is the NCAA
trying to protect? If the NCAA seeks to protect the amateur athlete, it would seemingly
be in the athlete's best interest to have competent representation to deal with professional
sports organizations and the complex business
and legal issues that surround the world of
professional sports. Protecting the athlete
from corrupt, unscrupulous sports agents is
an understandable and noble objective. But
even if the NCAA regulations play a role in
deterring corrupt and unscrupulous conduct
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on the part of agents (a notion that is highly
suspect), the rules are detrimental to the athlete if he is precluded from retaining a competent agent or lawyer to advocate on his behalf.4
First, this Article will discuss the NCAA
regulations applicable to all sports regarding the
use of agents by amateur athletes. Next, this
Article will discuss (i) the mechanics of the annual Major League Baseball draft, (ii) the factors that contribute to the necessity and desire
for amateur baseball players to retain a competent agent or lawyer before they have extinguished their NCAA eligibility, and (iii) how the
NCAA regulations are detrimental to both
drafted and draft-eligible amateur baseball players. Finally, this Article will discuss how the
NCAA should revise its regulations to better
serve the amateur athlete in the sport of baseball without destroying the distinction between
amateur and professional sports.

I. The NCAA Regulations Regarding Use of Agents
Section 12.3 of Article 12 (Amateurism)
of the NCAA Bylaws governs the use of agents.
The guiding principle of Article 12 is that only
amateur student-athletes are eligible for participation in intercollegiate athletics.5 According
to the NCAA, "[m]ember institutions' athletics
programs are designed to be an integral part of
the educational program [and] [tihe studentathlete is considered an integral part of the student body, thus maintaining a clear line of demarcation between collegiate athletics and professional sports." 6 The NCAA regulations also
indicate that "an amateur student-athlete is one
who engages in a particular sport for the educational, physical, mental and social benefits derived therefrom, and for whom participation
in that sport is an avocation."7

the agency agreement is applicable to all sports
unless the contract specifically states that it only
applies to a particular sport or sports.9 Thus,
an athlete who agrees to representation by an
agent is ineligible to participate in any sport at
any NCAA institution. ° However, if the athlete and the agent limit their agreement to a
particular sport or sports, then the athlete
would be ineligible to participate only in such
sport or sports. 1
The prohibition set forth in Bylaw 12.3.1
is not limited to agreements with respect to professional sports negotiations by an agent on behalf of an athlete that take place while the athlete is enrolled at the institution or has eligibility remaining in that sport. An athlete shall also
be ineligible if he or she agrees that the agent
will represent him or her in negotiations with
professional sports teams that are to take place
subsequent to the athlete's completion of eligi12
bility in that sport.
It is important to note that the NCAA
regulations prohibiting amateur athletes from
agreeing to representation by an agent apply
not only to collegiate athletes already enrolled
in NCAA institutions, but also to high school
students or graduates prior to collegiate enrollment.' 3 Thus, even high school students may
be declared ineligible to participate in collegiate
sports by the NCAA before they even sign a
scholarship or Letter of Intent to attend an
NCAA institution.

B. Benefits from Prospective
Agents
The NCAA has instituted strict regulations with respect to amateur athletes receiving any benefits, financial or otherwise, from
agents. The regulations even prohibit the
athlete's friends or relatives from accepting such
benefits. NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1.2, also known as
the "no benefits rule," provides as follows:

A. Agreements with Agents
The NCAA regulations prohibit amateur
athletes from agreeing to representation by an
agent. Bylaw 12.3.1, often referred to as the
"no agent rule," states that "[a]n individual shall
be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or she has agreed (orally or in
writing) to be represented by an agent for the
purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport."' 8 Furthermore,
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An individual shall be ineligible per Bylaw 12.3.1 if he or she (or his or her relatives or friends) accepts transportation
or other benefits from:
(a) Any person who represents
any individual in the marketing
of his or her athletics ability. The
receipt of such expenses constitutes compensation based on
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athletics skill and is an extra benefit not available to the student
body in general; or
(b) An agent, even if the agent
has indicated that he or she has
no interest in representing the
student-athlete in the marketing
of his or her athletics ability or
reputation and does not represent individuals in the studentathlete's sport. 4

ing discussions of a contract offer between an
athlete and a professional sports organization
or making any contact with a professional organization on behalf of the athlete.2 ' According to the NCAA, "[a] lawyer's presence during such discussions is considered representation by an agent." 22 Similar to the regulations
regarding entering agreements with agents and
receiving benefits, these rules also apply to high
23
school players prior to college enrollment.
In 1974, the members of the NCAA determined that student-athletes might need legal advice to assist them in evaluating and understanding a professional sports contract offered while they still had collegiate sports eligibility remaining. 24 The NCAA decided that,
during consideration of such a proposal, a student-athlete "may seek the advice of a lawyer
relative to future negotiations or discussion of
the individual's professional aspirations, so long
as the lawyer does not become actively involved
in negotiations with the professional team or
organization. ' 25 According to the NCAA, "once
the student decides to have legal counsel con-

These regulations apply to the receipt of benefits by any "individual." They apply not only
to collegiate athletes already enrolled in NCAA
institutions, but they also apply to high school
5
students or graduates prior to enrollment.1
For example, an amateur athlete's acceptance of automobile transportation from the
athlete's campus to a prospective agent's office
to discuss services the agent could provide to
the athlete upon signing a professional contract
is an improper. 6 In addition, a football agent
cannot provide transportation to a friend of a
member of the
"The crimes committed by a few
local Division I
'bad
college's basehave prompted the
ball team. 7 If
enactment
an agent proof numerous and
vides advice to
comprehensiv ye state statutes and
an amateur athgoverning rL Iles established by
lete about a professional sports
professional sp orts players unions and
contract, with
the understandcollegiate athEetic governing bodies."
ing that the athlete would pay
the agent for such services after the athlete has tact the professional club concerning the contract
been drafted, regardless of the fact that the offer, the individual has agreed to be represented
agent has the same fee arrangement for all ama- by an agent in the marketing of his or her athlet'
teur-athlete clients, that too would be an im- ics talent, and no longer is eligible per 12.3.2. 26
8
Interestingly, the NCAA makes no disproper benefit according to the NCAA.'
tinction between lawyers and non-lawyers in
C. Use of Lawyers and Other terms of giving consultation and advice to the
athlete. According to the NCAA, Bylaw 12.3.2
Advisors
The NCAA regulations permit an ama- "was not intended to restrict individuals other
teur athlete to retain a lawyer for consultation than lawyers (e.g., financial consultants, family
and advice concerning a proposed professional friends) from giving advice regarding professports contract.' 9 However, the lawyer, like an sional contracts." 27 Thus, any third party is peragent, may not represent the athlete in nego- mitted to advise the athlete provided that the
athlete in netiations for such a contract. 20 The regulations "advisor" does not represent the
28
even prohibit a lawyer from being present dur- gotiations for such a contract.
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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D. Professional Sports Counseling Panel and Head Coach
Exception

with a professional sports organization on behalf of the student-athlete.3"
The panel consists of at least three persons appointed by the institution's chief executive officer. 31 Not more than one person on the
panel may be a member of the athletic depart-

Section 12.3.4 of the NCAA Bylaws permits an authorized institutional professional
sports counseling
panel,
imple"...high school students may be
mented by the
member institudeclared ineligible to participate in
tion, to essentially
collegiate sports by the NCAA
engage in activities that an expebefore they have even signed a
rienced
agent
scholarship or Letter of Intent to
would otherwise
do, including the
attend an NCAA institution"
following:
(a) Advise
a student-athlete about a future professional career;
(b)
Provide direction on securing a
loan for the purpose of purchasing insurance against a disabling injury;
(c) Review a proposed professional
sports contract;
(d)
Meet with the student-athlete
and representatives of professional
teams;
(e)
Communicate directly (e.g., inperson, by mail or telephone) with
representatives of a professional athletics team to assist in securing a tryout
with that team for a student-athlete;
(f)
Assist the student-athlete in the
selection of an agent by participating
with the student-athlete in interviews of
agents, by reviewing written information player agents send to the studentathlete, and by having direct communication with those individuals who can
comment about the abilities of an agent
(e.g., other agents, a professional
league's players' association); and
Visit with player agents or representatives of professional athletics teams to
assist the student-athlete in determining his or her market value (e.g., potential salary, draft status).2 9
Although it is not expressly stated, the NCAA
also permits the panel to negotiate a contract

Spring 2005

ment staff; all others on the panel must be members of the institution's full-time staff.32 Finally,
no institutional staff member who is also an
agent may participate as a member on the
panel.

33

The legislative intent behind Bylaw
12.3.4, adopted in 1984, is worth noting:
This legislation was intended to
encourage member institutions
to provide guidance to their student-athletes regarding future
athletic professional careers.
While legislation previously was
adopted to permit institutions to
offer career counseling in all areas, in 1984 the membership
believed that student-athletes'
involvement with professional
athletics warranted special attention. While this focus on professional athletics is essential, it
should not detract from an
institution's role in providing
guidance to student-athletes in
career counseling generally.
Further, this legislation was intended to assist student-athletes
in making a decision regarding
whether to remain in school or
turn professional and providing
guidance to student-athletes regarding contracts and agree-
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letes to interact with professional sports teams
on their own without the use of an agent. For
example, an amateur athlete is permitted, both
before and after college enrollment, to ask a
professional sports organization for information
concerning his or her eligibility for the draft or
individual market value.4 ° The athlete and his
legal guardians are also permitted to negotiate
a contract with a professional sports organiza41
tion.
However, an amateur athlete loses eligibility if he or she asks, subsequent to initial fulltime collegiate enrollment, to be placed on the
draft list or supplemental draft list of a professional sports league even if (i) the athlete asks
to have his or her name be withdrawn from
the draft list prior to the actual draft, (ii) the
athlete's name remains on the draft list but he
or she is not drafted, or (iii) the athlete is drafted
but does not sign an agreement with any professional sports team.4 2 This NCAA regulation
is often referred to as the "no draft rule." The
only exception to the rule is for an enrolled student-athlete who plays basketball; he or she
may enter his or her name on the draft list one
time without jeopardizing his eligibility, provided that the student-athlete is not drafted by
any team and that he or she subsequently declares an intention in writing to resume intercollegiate participation within 30 days after the
4
draft.

ments with player agents. Additionally, a panel should provide
to the student-athlete a realistic
appraisal of his or her potential
for becoming a successful professional athlete. It is important
that the student-athlete receive
objective advice from individuals at institutions who have no
vested interest in the studentathlete's career. Essentially, a
panel should attempt to provide
information to the student-athlete regarding professional athletics that he or she may not be
able to obtain or understand suf34
ficiently himself or herself.
Unlike the regulations previously discussed in this Article pertaining to (i) agreements with agents, (ii) the use of lawyers and
other advisors, and (iii) the receipt of benefits,
the bylaw provisions regarding sports counseling panels only apply to collegiate athletes enrolled in NCAA member institutions.35 Therefore, high school players who have been
drafted, or anticipate being drafted, are prohibited under the NCAA Bylaws from receiving
any assistance in contacting professional teams
to secure a tryout, determining their market
value, or negotiating a contract with a professional sports organization.
The student-athlete's head coach at the
NCAA member institution may contact agents
to assist the athlete in selecting an agent and
determining his or her market value.3 6 The
coach may also contact professional sports organizations on behalf of the athlete to secure
tryouts and to assist the student-athlete in determining his or her market value.37 The coach
is not permitted, however, to receive compensation for such services. 3 8 If the head coach
partakes in these activities, he or she is then
required to consult with and report his or her
activities to the institution's professional sports
counseling panel; if the institution does not have
such a panel, then the coach is to report to the
39
institution's chief executive officer.

E. Draft Inquiry and Negotiations Without An Agent
The NCAA Bylaws permit amateur ath-

III. Application of the NCAA Regulations in Baseball
A. The Major League Baseball Amateur Draft
In June of each year, Major League Baseball conducts its amateur draft, known as the
First-Year Player Draft." In general, players
who are eligible to be drafted and sign a professional contract are (i) graduating high school
seniors, (ii) college players who have completed
their junior year or who are at least 21 years old
within forty-five days of the draft, and (iii) junior college players. 45 The team that drafts a
player has the exclusive right to negotiate a professional contract with that player until the
player becomes a college player by entering or
returning to college.4 6 If a player instead
chooses to become a professional athlete, the
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player signs a
standard minor
league player
47
contract.
The only
terms and conditions in the
standard player
contract that are
negotiable are
(i) the player's
signing bonus,
which must be
stated in a fixed dollar amount and paid to the
player before the end of the calendar year following the date of the contract, (ii) a provision
in which the player receives a payment of $2,500
contingent upon the player being retained by
the signing major or minor league club for a
period that may not exceed 90 days of the club's
playing season, (iii) a provision in which the
player receives standard "incentive bonus payments" contingent upon the player being on
the roster in a certain classification for 90 days
in any one season ($1,000 for the AA classification, $1,500 for the AAA classification, and
$5,000 for the major league level), and (iv) the
amount to be paid to the player by the club for
attendance at a college of the player's choice
for tuition, room, board, books and fees pursuant to the college scholarship plan.48

"The NCAA has instituted
strict regulations with respect
to amateur athletes receiving
any benefits, financial or
otherwise, from agents"

B. The "Signability" Factor
In the days, weeks, and months leading
up to the draft each year, scouts from all thirty
clubs and the Major League Scouting Bureau
evaluate all of the draft-eligible amateur players throughout the United States, Canada, and
Puerto Rico. As part of the evaluation process,
scouts assess a player's skill, makeup, and character. In evaluating character attributes, scouts
begin to develop a personal relationship with
select players. Scouts even ask players to take
psychological exams and to answer a variety of
questions in order to assess character and personality traits.
Another important component to a
scout's evaluation is the player's "signability."
This term, widely used among scouts, players,
and agents, refers to the amount of money it
will cost a team to sign a particular player to a
professional contract if that player is drafted.

-
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As one might expect, signability becomes more
of a factor with respect to high school seniors
and college juniors than with college seniors.
This is because younger players have the bargaining leverage of returning to school in the
fall following the June draft instead of signing a
professional contract.
Due to the steady increase in signing
bonuses of drafted players over the past ten to
fifteen years, signability has become more and
more important to the clubs. The signing bonuses of the players picked first in the baseball
draft for the last fifteen years are as follows:
1989:
1990:
1991:
1992:
1993:
1994:
1995:
1996:
1997:
1998:
1999:
2000:
2001:
2002:
2003:
salary
2004:

Ben McDonald - $350,000
Chipper Jones - $275,000
Brien Taylor - $1,550,000
Phil Nevin - $700,000
Alex Rodriguez - $1,000,000
Paul Wilson - $1,550,000
Darin Erstad - $1,600,000
Kris Benson - $2,000,000
Matt Anderson - $2,500,000
Pat Burrell - $3,150,000
Josh Hamilton - $3,960,000
Adrian Gonzalez - $3,000,000
Joe Mauer - $5,150,000
Bryan Bullington - $4,000,000
Delmon Young - $5,800,000 guaranteed
49
hat includes a $3,700,000 signing bonus
Matt Bush - $3,150,00050

It is important to note that a player's draft slot
is not necessarily indicative of the amount of a
signing bonus. For example, in the 2000 draft,
the twelfth pick in the draft received a signing
bonus in the amount of $5,300,00, which is
5
$2,300,000 more than the first pick that year. 1
In the 2002 draft, the second overall pick re-
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ceived $600,000 more than the first pick. 52 In
the 2004 draft, third round draft pick Matt
Tuiasosopo, a high school player from
Woodinville, Washington, signed for
$2,290,000, the equivalent to the bonus that
players in the top half of the first round received.53 Thus, it is easy to see how important
a player's signability is to the clubs at draft time.
In fact, a player's signability often determines whether a particular club will even
consider drafting that player. Prior to the draft,
scouts attempt to determine as precisely as possible a player's signability through discussions
with the player and/or his representativem Indeed, the Major League Rules expressly permit
club personnel to talk to any player, prior to
the draft, "at any time concerning a career in
professional baseball and discussing the merits
of the player's contracting, when eligible, with
any particular [c]lub."55
Thus, many clubs engage in "pre-draft
dealing" with certain players. In other words,
a scout or other front-office personnel engages
in negotiations with a player and/or his representative prior to the draft. Essentially, the
player makes a commitment to the club that
he will sign for a certain amount of money if
that club drafts him.56 This arrangement can
be beneficial to the club and the player because
it brings certainty to both sides; thus, a contract can be completed shortly after the draft
without the need for prolonged negotiations
5 7
throughout the summer.
The signing of Matt Bush, the number
one draft pick by the San Diego Padres out of a
local San Diego high school in 2004, involved a
pre-draft deal. Jim Callis from Baseball America
discussed the negotiations that took place between Padres general manager, Kevin Towers,
and the representatives of Matt Bush just days

before the draft:
The deal took four more phone calls, all
the Sunday morning before the draft
among Towers and Bush's advisors, Greg
Genske and Kenny Felder, both associates of longtime agent Jeff Moorad.
They went like this:
Call No. 1: Towers indicates a willingness to spend between $2.5 million and $3 million. Knowing Bush isn't the
true No. 1 talent, Genske wants
the $3.35 million No. 3 pick Kyle
Sleeth received last year. "I'm
not sure we can go much lower,"
Genske says.
Call No. 2: An hour later,
Towers calls back and says he
probably can't go over 3. Although no Padres deal would
slide Bush to at best the Devil
Rays at No. 4 or, more likely, the
Nos. 7-12 range (meaning just a
$2 million bonus and no hometown team), Genske still comes
down to only $3.25 million.
Towers says, "He's from San Diego. You want to go to Tampa
Bay? Or later? We're very prepared to roll the dice and take
[Stephen] Drew."
Call No. 3: Towers informs Genske, "3.1 is our final
offer, or we're walking." Genske
counters with 3.15. Towers tells
[scouting director, Bill] Gayton,
"We could stay at 3, and the kid
will call back and take the 3."
Call No.
4: Towers tells
Genske,
"We
have a deal at
3.15." 58

F"the
NCAA
makes
no
distinction between lawyers and
non-lawyers in terms of giving
consultation and advice to the
Lathlete."

As a result
of
the
signability factor, increased
signing bonuses,
and pre-draft
dealing, the draft
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process has become "big business." In addition to employing a staff of full- and part-time
scouts, clubs hire statisticians to analyze player
performance and lawyers to monitor compliance with the Major League Rules and negotiate player contracts. To level the playing field,
it is common practice for amateur baseball players to retain agents to assist them with the business aspects of the draft process, which often
results in the representative having contact with
professional clubs in violation of the NCAA
59
regulations.

C. The Regulations' Effect on
Players
Violations of the NCAA Bylaws by amateur athletes can have severe consequences for
the athlete and his institution. When the athlete becomes ineligible for competition due to
a violation, the member institution can be
forced to retroactively forfeit games. 60 Also, ineligibility can lead to further NCAA investigations, self-imposed probations, NCAA-imposed
suspensions, or even program termination. 61 In
essence, the NCAA has discretion to impose
any sanctions it deems appropriate.
In the summer of 2001, the NCAA ex-

ers retained a competent agent to represent him
and advocate on his behalf in his best interest.
Sowers did not receive any improper benefits
from the agent, nor did the agent engage in any
corrupt or unlawful behavior. 64
Sowers, like any draft-eligible baseball
player, is susceptible to violating NCAA rules
due to the timing of the draft and the Major
League Baseball draft-eligibility rules. The draft
takes place at the end, or shortly after the end,
of the high school and collegiate baseball regular seasons. Thus, draft-eligible baseball players do not have time to interview prospective
agents, to make an informed decision as to who
they want to represent them, and to have their
representative contact professional clubs on
their behalf to assess market value and determine which clubs are most interested. It is,
therefore, in the best interest of an amateur
baseball player to retain an agent before the
season starts.65
Baseball is significantly different from
other draft sports, such as football. Under the
National Football League (NFL) rules, amateur
football players are not draft-eligible until the
completion of their senior year in college unless, upon completion of their junior football
season, they ask
to be placed on
the NFL draft list.
,s
Thus,
high
school senior
football players
are not eligible
for the NFL
it
draft. As a result, they do not
face the difficult
decision
of
whether to sign
a professional contract or to enroll in college
after being drafted. As for college football players, their season ends in the end of November
or early December unless their team attends a
bowl game, in which case the season would end
in the first week of January at the latest. Therefore, college seniors, as well as college juniors
who have declared draft eligibility, have three
to four months between the end of the season
and the NFL draft in April in which to select an
agent and have their representative contact professional clubs on their behalf in preparation

"The NCAA Bylaw perm it
amateur athletes t :)interact
with professional spc rts teams
on their own withoi the use
of an agent:'
ercised that discretion. Before his freshman
year at Vanderbilt, Jeremy Sowers and his family retained an advisor regarding a proposed
contract after he was drafted in the first round
( 2 0th pick) by the Cincinnati Reds. The advisor
had contact with one or more representatives
of the Reds organization. 62 Sowers could not
reach an agreement with the Reds; he enrolled
at Vanderbilt in the fall of 2001. The NCAA
reprimanded Sowers with a six-game suspension for violating the no agent rule. 63 This result is disturbing in light of the fact that Sow-
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visor who has direct contact, by
way of negotiations or otherwise, with the
club (which is
impermissible).
In essence, the
regulations prohibit the student-athlete
from retaining a
competent lawyer or agent to negotiate a contract to the maximum benefit of the student-athlete; however,
they permit an amateur athlete to seek advice
from a lawyer about a standard player contract
and to negotiate a professional contract with
the aid of a member institution's professional
sports counseling panel.
According to the NCAA, these rules are
necessary to maintain "a clear line of demarcation between collegiate athletics and professional sports." The NCAA's objective, however,
is accomplished with the regulation that an
amateur athlete is ineligible to compete in a
collegiate sport once he or she signs a professional contract in that sport. Simply permitting a student-athlete to retain competent representation to contact professional clubs and to
advocate on his behalf to obtain a result that is
in his own best interests, financially and otherwise, would not destroy the line of demarcation any more than allowing the student-athlete or the professional sports counseling panel
to engage in the same conduct.
Prior to the annual baseball amateur
draft, it is clearly in the player's best interest,
due in large part to the signability issue and
pre-draft dealing, for him to (i) accurately assess his market value, (ii) evaluate the pros and
cons to signing a professional contract after his
senior year in high school or junior year in college (as the case may be), (iii) determine for how
much he is willing to sign a professional contract and properly convey this information to
the clubs, and (iv) learn about the Major League
Baseball rules and regulations. Further, once
the player is drafted, there is no compelling reason to deny a player the opportunity to obtain
maximum value for his services, even if that
requires retaining an experienced agent to ne-

"...an amateur athlete loses
eligibility if he or she asks,
subsequent to initial full-time
collegiate enrollment, to be placed
on the draft list or supplemental
draft list of a professional sports
.league..:'
for the draft. 66
After the completion of the season,
draft-eligible football players choose an agent
and execute a standard representation agreement with the agent issued by the NFL Players
Association.6 7
Once the player either completes his senior football season or declares himself draft-eligible after his junior season, he has
exhausted his remaining NCAA eligibility in that
sport. At that point, the player is not concerned
about violating the NCAA's prohibition against
entering agreements with agents. In contrast,
draft-eligible baseball players are obviously concerned about NCAA compliance because they
have remaining NCAA eligibility both before
68
and after the draft.

IV. Revisiting the Regulations: Two
Recommendations
A. Permit Players to Retain
Agents under the Supervision of the Member Institution
As succinctly stated by one commentator: "The NCAA's general rule on student-athlete contact with a sports agent is clear: A student-athlete risks losing his or her intercollegiate athletics eligibility by doing anything more
than talking with an agent. ' 69 The current
NCAA regulations make no distinction between
permissible and impermissible conduct on the
part of agents. This is because the NCAA has
no standing to discipline the agents since agents
are not members of the NCAA.7 ° Instead, the
NCAA makes the pertinent distinction between
an advisor who deals one-on-one with the student-athlete (which is permissible) and an ad-
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gotiate with the club. In the NCAA's view, the
student-athlete or the institution's professional
sports counseling panel is best qualified to
handle all of these pre- and post-draft responsibilities. 1 This perspective is flawed in numerous respects.
First, the player is clearly not the appropriate person to be handling these responsibilities. The amateur athlete is not experienced in
the business aspects of major league baseball
to adequately assess his market value or to effectively negotiate a professional contract. He
should not be given these responsibilities to
maintain in addition to his responsibilities in
the classroom and on the field. Second, players
graduating from high school are not going to
have access to professional sports counseling
panels at NCAA member institutions. In effect, the panels are only available to draft-eligible college players. Since it is not mandatory
that NCAA member institutions establish a professional sports counseling panel, many colleges
and universities do not even offer such a service to their student-athletes. With respect to
institutions that do have a panel for the benefit
of its student-athletes, it is questionable as to
whether the members of that panel are qualified to adequately serve the best interests of the
athlete.
Using Villanova University's panel as an
example, the Associate Dean of Administration,
the Associate Athletic Director, the university's
General Counsel, and the chairperson of the Department of Education and Human Services are
probably not experienced in baseball talent
evaluation or knowledgeable enough about the
Major League Baseball rules and regulations.
Furthermore, they probably do not have relationships with scouts and front-office personnel. Indeed, these individuals have full-time
jobs with major responsibilities at the university and likely cannot devote the necessary time
and effort to such details on behalf of the player.
In addition, there is an inherent conflict of interest when representatives of the university
advise its players whether to sign a professional
contract-the school may have an interest in
having its players play for the school another
year instead of becoming a professional.72
Student-athletes in every major collegiate sport who are professional prospects are
going to retain a representative experienced and
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knowledgeable in their particular sport to assist them in obtaining maximum draft status,
and rightfully so. However, with respect to
baseball players, the NCAA regulations create
an incentive for a player to engage in the agent
selection process in isolation, apart from the
assistance of the member institution and coaching staff, for fear that the player might lose eligibility or that he or the member institution
might be reprimanded. "Unscrupulous" agents
thrive in this type of environment.
The NCAA needs to recognize the problems caused by the timing of the baseball draft
and the Major League Baseball rules pertaining
to draft-eligibility, and make an exception for
student-athletes in the sport of baseball to retain agents. If such an exception is made and
the fear of NCAA reprimand is removed, more
college coaches and member institutions would
be inclined to provide assistance to student-athletes in the selection of an agent.73 The role of
the professional sports counseling panel would
then be limited to the evaluating potential
agents who are interested in representing the
player and assisting the player in the selection
of a competent representative. Keeping the "no
benefits" rule intact would help maintain the
integrity of the agent selection process and ensure that players are not subject to undue influence.

B. Standard Athlete-Agent
Representation Agreements
The NCAA should also require the student-athlete to execute a standard representation agreement with his agent, similar to the
NFL Players Association standard agreement
between draft-eligible football players and their
agents. In addition to helping to maintain the
integrity of the agent selection process, this
would enable the NCAA to establish certain
terms and conditions governing the relationship between the student-athlete and agent, including the duties, responsibilities, and fees of
the agent. Such written agreements would be
beneficial to both the athlete and the agent because it would replace the "loose" understandings that often result in disputes between the
parties with certainty. The student-athlete
would then be required to send a copy of the
executed representation agreement to the member institution, where it would be kept on file
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for a certain period of time for future reference.

V. Conclusion
The NCAA regulations regarding use of
agents are not practical for the amateur baseball player. More specifically, the regulations
fail to consider the timing of the baseball draft
and the Major League Baseball rules regarding
draft eligibility. As a result of the huge increases
in signing bonuses over the last fifteen years, a
player's signability has become a significant factor in the draft process and pre-draft dealing
has become commonplace in the industry-all
of which amounts to "big business." There is
no compelling reason to prohibit a player from
retaining a competent agent to deal directly
with the clubs, both pre- and post-draft, to
maximize the player's draft potential and obtain maximum value for his services. With the
assistance of the member institution and its
coaching staff in the agent selection process, as
well as standardizing player-agent representation agreements, the player is less likely to get
involved with an "unscrupulous" agent and the
line of demarcation between collegiate athletics and professional sports would remain undisturbed.
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known about this for some time so it does not
upset our season's plans as much as we think
it's unfair to an honest student-athlete." Id.

Warren Moon," Roethlisberger said. "I had
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When an amateur baseball player "retains"
an agent, the player and the agent do not sign a
representation agreement because the NCAA
rules prohibit such agreements. Therefore, the
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who left Miami University of Ohio after his jun- competent representation in order to make an
ior year to enter the 2004 NFL draft. After the informed decision about whether to declare
completion of the collegiate football season, Ben draft-eligibility after their junior season. Id.
moved to California and hired an agent (Leigh
However, a college football player who comSteinberg) who began preparing Ben for the pletes his junior season and is considering
draft and contacting NFL clubs on Ben's behalf. whether to declare draft eligibility is permitted
In the article, Kay expounded on Ben's daily to retain an experienced and competent adviroutine, and in particular Steinberg's efforts to sor to help him make the decision. If, after conelevate Ben's draft position, during the months sulting with his advisor, he determines that it is
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which the student athlete is enrolled to declare
the athlete ineligible for further intercollegiate
competition." Remis, supra note 1, at 9.
71According

to the NCAA, "a panel should provide the student-athlete a realistic appraisal of
his or her potential for becoming a successful
professional athlete. It is important that the student-athlete receive objective advice from individuals at institutions who have no vested
interest in the student-athlete's career." NCAA
Amateurism Regulations Summary, supra note 3,
§ II.G.1.
See Stiglitz, A Modest Proposal: Agent Deregulation, supra note 2, at 364 ("As long as the institution has a vested, financial interest in encouraging the student to stay, full time employees of the institution may not be wholly neutral.").
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The University of Miami, for example, requires every agent to register with the
university's NCAA compliance office prior to
speaking with any student-athlete. The University ensures that the agent has been certified by the State of Florida (which is a state law
requirement, see FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 468.453 (West
2001)), and also requires the agent to complete
a questionnaire in order to obtain references
and certain information about the agent and
his company.
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